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Abstract 
 
The European Union (EU) is developing its Common European Security and 
Defence Policy. New institutional structures have begun to work in Brussels and 
a 60,000 strong rapid deployment military force is being set up for 2003. The 
most recent literature, which builds on François Duchêne’s definition of a 
‘civilian power’ Europe (short on weapons but long on economic power), argues 
that the militarising of the EU is rendering such a concept obsolete. This paper 
takes the opposite view: thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might 
at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a 
force for the external promotion of democratic principles. The paper reviews the 
main characteristics of the civilian power model and offers a re-interpretation of 
the original Duchêne approach. It argues for the need to move from a civilian 
power ‘by default’ to a civilian power ‘by design’. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) is developing its Common European Security and 
Defence Policy (CESDP). It is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the Union, its so-called Second Pillar
1. The December 2000 Nice 
European Council has confirmed all the recent developments with regards to 
several new institutional bodies and a Rapid Deployment Force for the year 
2003. Over the last decade many atrocities in the former-Yugoslavia and other 
areas of the world, coupled with progress towards economic and political union, 
have acted as incentives for a truly European defence identity and capacity. The 
weaknesses of the EU as an international actor were there for all to see when the 
Americans had to intervene in the Balkans through NATO first in Bosnia in 
1995 and later in Kosovo in 1999. There was also a shift in the UK’s policy 
towards European defence. Although it might be premature to conclude that 
there has been an Europeanisation of the British
2, i t is equally true that without 
such a shift (Labour Party election victory in May 1997), there would have been 
no real progress on that issue
3, especially in such a short period of time. The 
decision to create a European defence capacity at the EU level is not without its 
critics. It also unclear what the implications for a newly revamped and enlarged 
NATO will be. The wider debate about the future of the integration process, the 
so-called finalité politique, has also been relaunched with the May 2000 Fischer 
speech
4. There is also an IGC (intergovernmental conference) which is 
scheduled for 2004 as a follow-up to the new Treaty of Nice
5. 
 
Over the last three decades the existing literature has regularly used the 
concept of a civilian power to describe the E U (then the EC or European 
Community) in its international relations. This approach can be summed up as 
follows: a civilian power is an entity that does have influence in the international 
system by using mainly economic, financial and political means, but not military 
                                                                 
1 For the CFSP see Regelsberger, E., et al.  (eds), Foreign Policy of the European Union 
(Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1997). For a background to it, see Nuttall, S.,  European Political 
Cooperation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). For the CESDP, see Survival, 42, no.2 (2000); 
see also Stavridis, S., European Security and Defence after Nice (Jean Monnet Working Paper 
No.31, University of Catania, March 2001). 
2 Howorth, J., ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative, Survival, 42, no.2 (2000): 
33-55. 
3 Heisbourg, F., ‘Europe’s Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity, Ibid., 5-15. 
4 See C. Joerges, et al. (eds), What kind of constitution for what kind of polity? Responses to 
Joschka Fischer (RSCAS/EUI, Florence, November 2000). 
5 The Treaty was agreed in its draft form by the European Council in Nice in December 2000. 
The formal treaty was signed on 26 February 2001. It has yet to be ratified. However, 
developments in the CESDP are taking place without any delay.  
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power. In fact, the initial argument presented by François Duchêne
6 was that, 
precisely because of the absence of military power, the EC could only be a 
civilian power (and not a superpower like the USA or the USSR). Nor was it  
desirable to add to the more traditional power politics model. The most recent 
literature argues that such a concept has been rendered obsolete because of the 
militarising of the EU
7. This paper takes the opposite view. Thanks to the 
militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real 
power in the world and more importantly as a real civilian power, that is as a 
force for the promotion of democratic principles in the world. In that respect, it 
builds on Maull’s recent similar application of the same concept to Germany 
after its military participation in the Kosovo War in 1999
8. 
 
The EU has now developed an institutional arrangement for military 
matters to be dealt with in Brussels, and it is in the process of setting up a rapid 
military deployment force. All EU states (minus Denmark because of its 
Maastricht opt-out) have now made the necessary troops commitments. A 
number of bilateral initiatives (the 1998 Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration) 
and EU-wide decisions (European Council meetings in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, 
and Nice in 1999-2000) have put flesh to this new European commitment. This 
paper does not consider the implications of such a development for EU-NATO 
and EU-USA relations
9. Nor does it deal with the wider question of the finalité 
politique of the integration process, or what kind of defence capacities should be 
deployed. It only considers the implications of these developments on the utility 
of the concept of a civilian power Europe.  
  
In order to make this case, the paper consists of a review of the main 
characteristics of the civilian power model and also of the main criticisms 
levelled at the concept throughout the years. It offers a re-interpretation of the 
original Duchêne approach, which contained two elements, and not only the role 
of non-military means as stressed by the literature to date. The importance of the 
international system is also emphasised correctly in the literature but I argue that 
                                                                 
6 Duchêne, F., 'Europe in World Peace', in Mayne, R. (ed.),  Europe Tomorrow  
(Fontana/Collins, London, 1972), 32-49; 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', in 
Kohnstamm M. and Hager W.  (eds), A Nation Writ Large (Macmillan, London, 1973) 1-21. 
7 Whitman, R.,  From Civilian Power to Superpower?   The International Identity of the 
European Union (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998); Smith, K., ‘The End of Civilian Power 
Europe: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?, The International Spectator, 35, no. 2 
(2000): 11-28; Edwards, G.,  Europe’s Security and Defence Policy and Enlargement: the 
Ghost at the Feast?, EUI Working Paper RSC No.2000/69 (Florence, November 2000). 
8 Maull, H., ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”?’,  Survival, 42, no.2 
(2000): 56-80. 
9 See Remacle, E., ‘Défense européenne: entre “New Frontier” et Sainte Alliance’, in 
Magnette, P. and Remacle, E. (eds), Le nouveau modèle européen (Editions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, Brussels, 2000), 195-205.  
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it should be the intrinsic nature of the EU that determines its foreign policy and 
not the other way round. Thus, there is a need to move from a civilian power by 
default to a civilian power by design. The paper then offers a rationale for not 
accepting that the concept is obsolete, but instead that it is reinforced by current 
events. Because it argues that the militarising of the Union is an opportunity for 
the EU to act as a real civilian power, i.e. an international actor that promotes 
effectively democratic principles in the world. 
 





The concept of civilian power was first used with regards to Japan and West 
Germany. The reasoning behind the application of that concept to these two 
states was to contrast their growing power in the economic field to their historic 
defeats in 1945, their continued limited political independence (both legal and 
de facto) and overwhelming military dependence on the USA
11. 
 
A number of observers of the European scene, in particular the Director of 
the London-based IISS François Duchene
12, then expanded on the 
Japanese/German civilian power approach by applying to the European 
Economic Community (EEC). Their main objective was to speculate about 
future scenarios for international and European security. This was the time of 
détente, the Vietnam debacle, and the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. It was also the time of the first European 
Community enlargement to include three new members, but most importantly 
the UK, with its vast international links. There was also the optimistic Report on 
European Union which included the possibility of European monetary union by 
the year 1980. The latter was seen as a direct challenge to the USA’s dominance 
in West Europe and the Western world. 
 
                                                                 
10 I have no space here to discuss the ‘democratic peace’ argument (democracies do not fight 
each other) which is a sophisticated version of the civilian power as described by Duchêne for 
EC/EU intra-relations.  There is little doubt that nobody expects a military confrontation 
between two (or more) EU member states. The same applies to a large extent to most 
applicant countries. This is part of the ‘civilianisation’ process described by many observers 
of the civilian power concept. But the link between the Kantian approach to international 
relations (see Russett, B.,  Grasping the Democratic Peace ( Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1993);  Kantian Peace? It Exists (RSC/EUI lecture, Florence, 15 May 1998)
)and 
the Duchêne thesis has not been made clearly enough in my view. However, it falls beyond 
the direct remit of this paper. 
11 Hans Maull returned to the original use of the term to one of these two countries, Germany, 
in 2000 (see below).  
12 Duchêne, ‘Europe in World Peace’;  ‘The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence’.  
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There was also ample expectation of a possible US withdrawal from 
Europe because of the existence of nuclear parity between the two superpowers. 
Indeed, it was a constant argument of those supporting the idea of a civilian 
power to agree with those who instead supported a more militarised version that 
Europe needed its own foreign policy because US and European interests were 
diverging more and more in international relations
13. 
 
There were two main characteristics of a civilian power: First, the absence 
of military means (both conventional and nuclear) and the presence of economic 
and financial importance in the international system. In other words, a `civilian 
group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces` which is 
how Duchêne described the EC in 1973
14. In Kenneth Twitchett’s words, it is: 
 
‘an international polity as yet possessing no military dimension, but able to exercise 
influence on states, global and regional organisations, international corporations and 
other transnational bodies through diplomatic, economic and legal factors’
15. 
 
Duchêne only mentioned the second characteristic briefly: a civilian power 
promotes through its foreign policy the ideals of democracy, human rights, 
economic growth and international cooperation. To quote Duchêne again in his 
application of the concept to the Western Europe of the early 1970s, 
 




The general conclusion then was that the importance of military power 
was diminishing as fast as that of economics was growing. This prediction was 
'confirmed' by the energy (oil) crisis of 1973 (and later that of 1979). In both 
cases it was not possible to use military force, especially nuclear weapons, to 
force a change of economic policy of a non-traditional international actor, 
namely, the OPEC cartel. The latter organisation’s growing influence was 
confirmed in Europe’s shift to a much more pro-Arab policy with regards to the 
Middle Eastern conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours. 
 
Duchêne’s conclusion was also based on his prediction that the EEC 
could not, and would not, develop into a full federal state with a common army 
and a common government. He disagreed with the fundamental arguments of an 
alternative approach to the EC in the early 1970s: that it was a `super-power in 
                                                                 
13 Duchêne, ‘The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence’, 9. 
14 Ibid., 19. 
15 As quoted in Ifestos, P.,  European Political Cooperation: towards a framework of 
supranational diplomacy? (Gower, Aldershot, 1987), 62. 
16 Duchêne, 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', 20.  
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the making`
17. Duchêne stressed the impracticability of this approach: it was 
mainly due to the very limited nuclear capabilities of France and Britain. In 
addition, there was no real likelihood of a common decision-making process. A 
good illustration of the latter point could be found in a famous newspaper 
cartoon with a military officer still waiting to press on the nuclear button whilst 
one of his colleague on the phone, probably with Brussels, kept on telling him: 
'Wait, it is still 6 member states for and 6 member states against'
18. Duchêne’s 
other prediction was that the EC could not and should not develop into an 
unarmed or armed neutral power either
19. Thus, an easier option (and a more 
realistic one) would be to promote world cooperation, based on trade and 
economics. In other words, the EC was a civilian power by default. 
 
Duchêne also warned us about the need for the EC to promote democratic 
and civilian standards both internally and externally. Otherwise he predicted that 
the EC `will itself be more or less the victim of power politics run by powers 
stronger and more cohesive than itself`
20. He also stressed the idealistic mission 
of the EC as summed up in the 1950 Schuman declaration. Thus, he was fully 
aware that his application of the concept of a civilian power contained both a 
descriptive and a normative dimension. The question of desirability (or not) of 
the concept itself in general, and as applied to the EC in particular, was rather 
neglected in the years that followed. The question of its desirability only 
reappeared in the early 1990s and again later in that decade
21. 
 
The Realist Challenge: a Contradiction in Terms 
 
There were a number of problems with the concept itself, let alone i ts 
application to the EC, which were highlighted at the turn of the 1970s/1980s 
years. They materialised in an oft-quoted attack on the concept made by Hedley 
Bull in 1983. He described it as `a contradiction in terms`
22. This was during the 
so-called `Second Cold War`, hence reinforcing further the possible charge that 
the concept is only relevant during periods of détente in international relations 
but very much less so during periods of high international tension. Bull argued 
                                                                 
17 Galtung, J., The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (George Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1973). 
18 I owe this example to Christopher Hill. 
19 Duchêne, 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', 13-15. 
20 Ibid., 20-21. 
21 See below Hill, C., 'European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model  - or flop?' in 
Rummel R. (ed.),  The Evolution of an International Actor-Western Europe’s New 
Assertiveness (Westview Press, Boulder/Co,. 1990), 31-55; Zielonka, J.,  Explaining Euro-
Paralysis-Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
1998). 
22 Bull, H. 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms', in Tsoukalis, L. (ed.),  The 
European Community - Past, Present & Future (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983), 150-170.  
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that the existence of special international circumstances of lessened tension 
between the super-powers in the early 1970s had led to the mistaken view that 
military force did not matter any longer. He pointed to a number of problems in 
the world where force continued to play an important role and highlighted that 
the Soviet military threat continued unabated whereas the USA seemed to have 
more and more diverging interests with its West European allies. He called for a 
`European strategic policy` which would include both a conventional  and a 
nuclear dimension. That is to say a militarising of the then EC. This normative 
aspect of his analysis is generally missed in the wider debate that followed his 
attack on the concept of a civilian power. 
 
Bull was not the only academic who contested the validity of the concept 
in the 1980s. Some stressed the limitations of the existing EC arrangements, 
namely that Europe and especially `EPC [European Political Cooperation] has 
some striking deficiencies in the field of security`, in particular in terms of crisis 
management mechanisms and with regards to a coordinated arms trade policy
23. 
Others reiterated the importance of the international system on the validity of the 
concept. Ifestos concluded that `the turbulences of the 1970s and first half of the 
1980s [have] tended to discredit` this approach
24. 
 
The Counter-attack: Still a Useful Concept 
 
However, a number of academics came to the rescue of the concept
25 and argued 
that despite obvious limitations in the role the EC could play in the world, the 
civilian power approach did offer some useful insight in its international 
relations. Reinhart Rummel contrasted the moral approach taken by the 
Europeans to the more power politics view of the USA. Christopher Hill
26 
stressed that one should be less critical of the concept because power politics did 
contain some rather important limitations too. He mentioned the fact that not all 
international politics are exclusively about military power; that the use of 
military force in other countries has `a dubious record`; that the record of 
civilian power, especially in the EC, is rather substantial; and that it is a more 
desirable concept than a superpower. Here, Hill takes the view that any 
development in the direction of a super power would go against the intrinsic 
nature of the EC
27. 
                                                                 
23 Pijpers, A., 'The Twelve out-of-area: A civilian power in an uncivil world?' in Pijpers A. et 
al (eds), European Political Cooperation in the 1980s (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988), 
143-164, quote on 157. 
24 Ifestos, European Political Cooperation, 68. 
25 I do not consider two immediate responses to Bull because they more or less amounted to a 
reiterating of the importance of NATO and the Americans, see Moisi, D., in Tsoukalis,  The 
European Community - Past, Present & Future, 165-167; Hacke, C. in Ibid., 166-170. 
26 Hill, 'European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model - or flop?’. 
27 This view was later repeated by Zielonka, see below.  
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There remains however the unresolved question about the relative 
importance of the two characteristics in the initial Duchêne definition. The 
emphasis was mainly on the first one, with the added dimension of the 
normative aspect of the whole question, that is to say, the desirability or 
otherwise of the civilian power concept. Thus on both descriptive and normative 
grounds there were several supporters and several opponents to the concept of a 
civilian power Europe. 
 
By giving more emphasis to the first part of Duchêne’s definition of a 
civilian power, i.e. non-military means, rather than the second part on the 
promotion of democratic principles, the whole debate ignored the more 
problematic question of how to promote these principles without ever having to 
use force. This is more than just a theoretical question because it implies, though 
not explicitly, that democracies should never fight. History and reason point to a 
different direction of course. What would have been a civilian response to 
Hitler`s military takeover of Europe? It is clear that the question of military 
power as part of the civilian power concept remained rather under-studied.  In 
that regard, there is also a certain slippage in Duchêne`s analysis between means 
and power
28. He seems to equate the two when in fact his own definition of 
power might imply the need for the occasional use of military means after all.  
 
Part 2: The Post-Cold War Era: a Real Window of Opportunity for a 
Civilian Power Europe 
 
A revival of the concept occurred with the end of the Cold War. Juliet Lodge’s 
contribution on civilian power Europe in 1993 is extremely important for two 
reasons, but only one will be developed here
29. First, she adds a new element to 
the concept of a civilian power Europe: the question of the democratic control of 
foreign policy making in Europe. Such a development has not received much 
attention. But I do not develop it here further as it is an important question for 
the EU’s foreign and defence policy irrespective of whether or not one applies 
the concept of civilian power
30. 
                                                                 
28 Duchene, 'The EC and the uncertainties of interdependence', 19. 
29 Lodge, J., 'From civilian power to speaking with a common voice: the transition to a CFSP', 
in Lodge, J. (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, Pinter, 2nd ed., 
1993), 227-251. 
30 Christopher Hill has also correctly pointed out that because of its intrinsic nature, European 
foreign policy allows for more openness and therefore possibility of democratic control (and 
particularly parliamentary control by the European Parliament) than traditional national 
foreign policies
  (Hill, 'European foreign policy: Power bloc, civilian model  - or flop?, 46-47). 
See also Beiber, R., ‘Democratic Control of European Foreign Policy’, European Journal of 
International Law, 1, no.1/2 (1990): 148-173; Stavridis, S., 'The "second" democratic deficit 
in the European Community: the process of European Political Cooperation', in Pfetsch F.  
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Lodge’s second element is a real contribution to the wider debate over the 
concept of a civilian power. She mentions that in the 1990 Paris OSCE Charter, 
there is clear evidence of an effort to give ‘a human face to security’, that is to 
say to move towards ‘a civilianization of security’
31. This expanding definition 
of security to include human rights and other elements of international relations 
means that security covers more than just military aspects.  She specifically 
refers to the European Parliament efforts to include issues of human rights, arms 
trade and disarmament as matters of general security interest 
32. Lodge also 
mentions that a civilian power concentrates on an effort to limit, but not to 
eliminate the use of force
33. This is an element in the debate over the utility of 
the concept of a civilian power Europe that is largely ignored. It only comes 
back to the fore in 2000 with Hans Maull’s study of Germany after it had 
participated militarily in the Kosovo War.  It is a vital element in the argument I 
make in this part and one of the reasons why I still think the concept of a civilian 
power is relevant despite the current militarising of the EU (see part 3 below). 
 
Renewed interest in the late 1990s was not limited to Lodge’s 
contribution. It also materialised in mainly three books, all published in 1998, 
respectively by Jan Zielonka, Richard Whitman, and Nicole Gnesotto
34.  
Zielonka’s concern it to explain what needs to be done to facilitate the 
emergence of a real EU foreign policy. He complains about a number of 
deficiencies in the existing system. He argues that a civilian power Europe and a 
clear delimitation of its geographical (territorial) membership are needed 
urgently. He makes a case for  the concept of a civilian power on the grounds 
that it is a much better alternative to that of a superpower in the making. His 
main argument is that the civilian, i.e. non-military, dimension of European 
integration is at the heart of this process. To diverge from it would mean to 
destroy its very soul. He sees NATO and national military forces as perfectly 
adequate for the provision of traditional defence tasks. He argues against any 
militarising of the EU. There are a number of problems with his interpretation, 
not least that his prediction is not confirmed by recent events. But more 
importantly he seems to fail to understand that to promote democratic principles 
in the world might sometimes entail the use of military means. This means that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
(ed.),  International Relations and Pan-Europe (Lit Verlag, Münster, 1993), 173-194; 'The 
Democratic Control of the CFSP', in Holland, M. (ed.), Common Foreign and Security Policy: 
the record and reform (Pinter/Cassells, London, 1997), 136-147. ‘The democratic control of 
the  EU’s foreign and security policy after Amsterdam and Nice’,  Current Politics and 
Economics in Europe, Special Issue edited by A. Verdun and S. Stavridis (2001, in press). 
31 Lodge, 'From civilian power to speaking with a common voice’, 233-234. 
32 Ibid., 235. 
33 Ibid., 249. 
34 Zielonka,  Explaining Euro-Paralysis; Whitman,  From Civilian Power to Superpower?; 
Gnesotto, N., La puissance et l’Europe (Presses de Sciences-Po, Paris, 1998).  
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there is a clear contradiction between his wish that the Atlantic Alliance and 
national defence policies continue to dominate the security agenda in Europe, 
and the need for an autonomous European force. A contradiction that is further 
complicated by his correct emphasis on the need to democratise the CFSP and 
the EU’s external relations. I fully agree with such a prescription but I fail to see 
how Zielonka can seriously call for a democratic debate about foreign and 
security policy in Europe without calling into question the USA’s predominance 
in Europe? 
 
Whitman offers a different approach to the civilian power Europe debate 
by refusing the dichotomy between that concept and that of a superpower in the 
making. He uses a systems approach which he regards as superior to more 
traditional theories. This is not the place to argue that it is unclear to me what 
Whitman is actually adding to our understanding of the EU as an international 
actor. But his work is useful in his emphasis on the democratic dimension of the 
whole discussion, with a whole chapter dedicated to the role of the European 
Parliament in world affairs
35. He concludes that the current militarising of the 
EU is rendering the concept of a civilian power Europe obsolete. His is yet 
another analysis that concentrates in my view far too much on the means used in 
foreign policy, rather than on the ends. Perhaps there is evidence of this 
confusion when, only a year later, he appears to qualify his own prediction when 
he refers to the possibility a ‘rebirth of civilian power Europe’
36.  
 
As for Nicole Gnesotto, her main interest is not so much the concept of 
civilian power itself. She deals with the concept of power and contrasts the 
current civilian power Europe to its potential political power. There are a 
number of problems with her approach, in particular her emphasis on the need 
for a  choc federateur to create that political power. Indeed, there is very little 
evidence of such a development especially in light of recent development in the 
CFSP and in the creation of the CESDP. But she does offer a good account of 
why the French rapprochement with NATO (and vice-versa) did not take place 
in the mid-1990s. She says that NATO does not allow for an independent 
European caucus to develop within the Alliance and thus create a real European 
force
37. Her discussion of how effective, or otherwise, American foreign policy 
has been is also relevant because the USA possess both military and non-
military powers. Also relevant is her reference to the role of parliaments in 
                                                                 
35 See note 30 above. 
36 Whitman, R., Developing capabilities reducing expectations: The rebirth of civilian power 
Europe?, Paper presented at the ECSA-USA Sixth Biennial Conference, Pittsburgh, 2-5 June 
1999. 
37 Gnesotto, La puissance et l’Europe, 99.  
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foreign and security issues
38, although she does not fully develop either of these 
points. 
 
Therefore, we can see that once more the desirability or otherwise of the 
concept is given more predominance than its feasibility. Moreover, the 
incompatibility of military means with the concept itself is reiterated constantly. 
No one questions that assumption. What if military means were necessary to 
uphold civilian values? This return to basics materialises in the late 1990s and in 
2000 with a  de facto militarising of the EU, but the dominant view then turned 
out to argue that we are witnessing the end of the applicability of the concept to 
the European case. 
 
Part 3: The Militarising of the EU: a Premature Announcement of a Death 
Foretold? 
 
The concept of a civilian power Europe is perhaps even more relevant today 
than it was probably during the 1980s and 1990s as the EU has decided to 
develop a European defence identity and capability. It is difficult to know when 
the so-called security taboo was broken. Some argue that it was well before 
then, possibly with the reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU) in 
the early 1980s and the use of the phrase ‘economic and political aspects of 
security’ in the Single European Act (SEA)
39. But the introduction of a CFSP, 
with the ‘eventual‘ (Maastricht Treaty) and later ‘progressive’ (Amsterdam 
Treaty) ‘framing of a common defence policy’ leading eventually to a common 
defence, are key developments in the process of militarising the European 
integration process. 
 
All these developments also mean that a non-military road for the EU is 
no longer the path integration in Europe is taking now. In other words, it is an 
empirical observation to note that such a development is actually occurring. 
What its implications are for the concept of a civilian power Europe are more of 
a normative nature. They have led to a renewed interest in the subject with 
mainly two opposing views: One represented by Hans Maull (with regards to 
Germany) which argues that even with the use of force there is still a civilian 
power in action
40. The other, dominant, view represented by Karen Smith argues 
on the contrary that the whole concept of a civilian power is regrettably over 
now that military means are being added to the integration process
41. What 
                                                                 
38 Ibid., 88. 
39 Lodge, ‘From civilian power to speaking with a common voice’, 231. 
40 Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’. 
41 Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power Europe’; see also Whitman,  From Civilian Power to 
Superpower?; Edwards,  Europe’s Security and Defence Policy.  
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follows considers t he two arguments in turn, but I clearly favour Maull’s 
perspective. 
 
Smith takes the view that the whole concept is no longer viable. She 
argues that the EU `despite the obvious current weaknesses of [its] defence 
dimension, […] is now abandoning its civilian power image`
42. She offers the 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the enlargement process as two of 
the best examples of a civilian power at work. However she laments the recent 
military developments. She argues that `the EU repudiates civilian power by 
acquiring a defence dimension’
43. She questions the assumptions behind these 
recent developments in defence cooperation. The whole approach to develop a 
military capacity is too state-centric, based on an excessive expectation of the 
utility of military force, and will create more problems than it will solve. 
Because Europe is currently considered as an alternative to the USA precisely as 
a result of its civilian status. She therefore argues for a continuation of the 
division between the EU and the WEU, the latter covering military matters. She 
also considers that NATO is enough as far as territorial defence is concerned
44. 
 
All this in my view is a contradiction in terms. It becomes much clearer 
when she argues that military interventions will most probably be needed in the 
future but it does not have to be the EU’s job
45. It is fine for an enlarged WEU to 
do the job but she denies this same right to the EU. Moreover, the fact that the 
WEU is disappearing off the scene seems to have been an option that Smith did 
not envisage at all. 
 
However, she correctly points out that recent developments in the field of 
European defence are of much more importance than attempts at revitalising the 
WEU in the early 1980s. In that respect she is right to point to Tsakaloyannis` 
rather premature announcement of the end of a civilian power Europe twenty 
years ago
46. But where I fundamentally disagree with Smith is when she 
concentrates exclusively her use of a civilian power on the non-military means. 
She very quickly drifts into a position of ‘wanting her cake and eating it’ at the 
same time, to use a common expression in English: let us not have a European 
defence capacity because the Americans and NATO are still here and the United 
Nations should be more actively involved. But she does not address the question 
                                                                 
42 Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power Europe’, 12. 
43 Ibid., 16, reversed order in original. 
44 Ibid., 22. 
45 Ibid., 25. 
46 Tsakaloyannis, P. 'The EC: from civilian power to military integration' in Lodge J. (ed.), 
The EC and the Challenge of the Future (Pinter, London, 1st ed., 1989), 242-255. 
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of what the EU should do in case the Americans are unwilling to act or the UN 
is unable to do so. 
 
She also overemphasises in my view the `appeal` of the EU as only 
civilian. Many countries want to join the EU for economic reasons but also often 
for security ones. Finland is the first example that comes to mind in recent years, 
let alone the long list of Eastern countries, but one could go further back to the 
Greek accession which contained both an internal side (consolidation of 
democracy) and an external one (eventually the defence of Greek territory 
against Turkish aggression). The fact that the EU partners have not often 
supported Greece (most recently in 1996
47) does not invalidate the claim that 
Greece wanted E C membership for security reasons as well as economic and 
political. Greece’s push for recognition of national borders as EU borders and its 
constant quest for an EU-version of Article 5 (NATO) proves the case. The fact 
that when Greece joined the WEU it was denied automatic access to the WEU’s 
Article 5 confirms that security matters are very important for many an applicant 
country, past, present or future
48. A similar argument could be made for Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary that decided to go full stream for NATO 
membership when they saw that EU accession was postponed  ad calendas 
Graecas. They still want EU membership because they realise that NATO only 
offers military security, but security covers more than just military affairs
49. 
 
Smith also brings to the fore another important issue: the difference 
between the views of the neutral states and the big states in the EU. For the 
former, the Petersberg Tasks only mean humanitarian rescues and peace-keeping 
once the fighting is over and the UN allows it, whereas the latter have a much 
more general view of what constitutes peace-making action. This is an important 
discussion which relates directly to the question of a civilian power Europe after 
the militarising of the EU. It seems quite clear that the latter view is more 
consistent with the objective of a fully integrated Europe with its own defence 
policy and own defence. The former can only allow the USA to continue to 
dominate world affairs. This was painfully clear in the Balkans over the last 
decade. 
 
                                                                 
47 Over the Imia incident, see E. A thanassopoulou, ‘Blessing in Disguise? The Imia Crisis and 
Turkish-Greek Relations’, Mediterranean Politics, 2/3  (1997): 76-101. 
48 See also Heisbourg, ‘Europe’s Strategic Ambitions’,  14, for a similar argument about the 
defence peculiarities of some existing EU states, i.e. Finland and Greece. 
49 I do not explore here the continued or otherwise viability of Article 5, be it from an 
American perspective or from that of the new NATO member states.  
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Smith is also right to mention the new debate about the civilian resources 
available in the EU which could be used in times of natural disasters and other 
emergencies. What she tends to ignore is that sometimes disasters do happen 
within civil war or international war situations. Then, the question becomes who 
would protect those civilian troops if there is no military capability available? 
Which brings me to one the conclusions of this paper: to use only one side of the 
Duchêne definition is not enough. Civilian power means nothing if it is only 
referring to non-military means. How one uses those means is what makes a 
civilian power. The second dimension of Duchêne’s definition, that is, the 
promotion of civilian values, is as important in my view. Of course this is re-
interpreting the concept. But using only one half of the original approach was 
also a re-interpretation of the concept. 
 
I very much prefer Maull’s interpretation of a civilian power Germany 
after Kosovo. It is ironic that it is his definition of a civilian power that Smith 
uses but she does not arrive at the same conclusion. In addition to the traditional 
elements used by Duchêne in the 1970s, Maull’s approach has the advantage of 
referring to the need to try and constrain the use of force
50. In that respect it is 
reminiscent of Lodge’s contribution to the debate (see above). This is a much 
more rewarding definition because it allows for the possible use of force under 
extreme circumstances. But by doing so it means that the militarising of the EU 
is still possible under the civilian power à -la-Maull. Indeed, Maull argues that 
West Germany was a civilian power during the Cold War because even then its 
military participation in NATO actions within the context of collective defence 
was permissible. Now that the 1994 Constitutional Court decided that it was still 
possible, indeed desirable, for the Germans to participate in UN-authorised 
missions following prior approval by the Bundestag. Maull is right to point out 
that over the conflicts in Y ugoslavia Germany chose ‘solidarity and the 
promotion of human rights over its desire to avoid the use of force’
51. Thus 
Germany remained a civilian power despite the use of force.
52 The importance 
of promoting human rights was reiterated as a key element of the civilian power 
approach. What I found of particular interest in Maull’s analysis are the 
theoretical implications of the militarising of the EU for the concept of civilian 
power Europe. His is a more convincing theoretical argument than Smith’s 
conclusion that regretfully the concept is no longer viable. 
 
                                                                 
50 Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’, 56. 
51 Ibid., 72. 
52 There is also an element of policy justification. This is a debate I do not enter into here. It is 
common practice to see academic analysis sometime act as a  post-facto justification of a 
foreign policy change. For an even clearer example see Wrede, H -H., 'Friendly Concern'  - 
Europe's Decision-making on the Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia',  The Oxford 
International Review, IV, no. 2 (1993): 30-32.  
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Maull also discusses the prospects of European integration in defence and 
appears rather pessimistic about such a move because all defence budgets are on 
the decrease (down to 1.5% of GDP in Germany
53), there is very little chance of 
a real common European defence procurement policy, and a supranationalisation 
of defence
54. It is interesting to note that although Maull’s article is a study of 
the domestic sources of recent German foreign and security policy, his empirical 
assessment of Europe’s future defence integration prospects are not very 
dissimilar to those expressed by Duchêne nearly three decades ago. There is 
another important point in this conclusion which I share overall: if the military 
budgets are declining and national markets remain closed to Europeanisation 
(which would means economies of scales), how efficient a civilian power the 
EU would be in the future? 
 
Summing up the concept at the beginning of 2001, where does all this 
leave us with the concept of a civilian power Europe? Duchêne’s main 
contribution is of course to have put the concept on the academic agenda on 
what Europe is or should be in general and its international role in particular. 
His description of a limited military force mainly using national and non-EC/EU 
means remains valid today despite significant progress towards a military force 
at the EU level in the last couple of years. In my view however the second part 
of his definition is far more important: the EU must promote democratic 
principles in third countries and act therefore as a civilian power. Otherwise, as 
Duchêne himself had stressed such a long time ago, it runs the risk of being 
overtaken by traditional power politics. Integration in Europe is a negation of 
traditional power politics but it does not mean that power is irrelevant. It is how 
one uses it that becomes important. 
 
Bull’s contribution was to show the limitations of an exclusion of military 
means. In other words, he helped us understand that a civilian power cannot be a 
pacifist power or a neutral power in the 20
th century and beyond. Such an 
assessment is all the more relevant in the post Cold War era. Who was right, 
Duchêne or Bull? In my view, both. The former because of the attention he 
created around the concept, and the latter because he stressed quite early the 
limitations of concentrating exclusively on the non-military means. Perhaps now 
that the integration process in Europe is developing a military capacity both 
aspects will come to a fruitful coherent whole. Of course, there is no guarantee 
that such a development will take place. But the record to date has shown the 
limits of a civilian entity, as opposed to a civilian power.  
 
                                                                 
53 Maull, ‘Germany and the Use of Force’, 70. 
54 Ibid., 73.  
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Hill was right to highlight that force is not always leading to the expected 
results thus emphasising also that how one uses its power, be it military or not, 
is as important, as what kind of power is available. Lodge’s stress on the need to 
view civilian power as a means for limiting, rather than eliminating, the use of 
force is particularly important. As for Smith she missed the real point in my 
view, concentrating too much on the military means rather than on the wider 
philosophy of a civilian power. Maull did a much better job in that particular 
respect although he did not apply it to the EU but to Germany. 
 
Part 4: The Concept Revisited: a Civilian Power Europe Mark II 
 
In this concluding section I sum up the main implications of the militarising of 
the EU. I argue that the use of military means can be of a civilian type if it 
promotes human rights and democratic principles. It represents a re-
interpretation of the original Duchêne two-part definition. The emphasis is on 
the second part of his definition. 
 
There are many examples of a civilian power Europe Mark I. B e it the 
enlargement process of the Union, or the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe
55, or other smaller examples such as the EU administration of Mostar, or 
the use of the D-Mark in Kosovo. Bodo Hombach, the special coordinator for 
the Stability Pact  summed it up well when he argued that by financially 
supporting it at the rate of $2.1 billion, the EU and its partners are consolidating 
stability, peace and democracy as well as economic progress
56. But at the same 
time, the IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and the K -FOR in Kosovo are making these 
developments possible. To separate the two amounts to wishful thinking. It is 
also a normative statement: instead of having a civilian power by default, let us 
have a civilian power by design. This would confirm Duchêne’s view of how 
effective the European experience has been since the end of the Second World 
War. Peace, stability, democracy and economic prosperity have replaced 
constant tensions, conflicts, and wars. Thus, we have what I would call a civilian 
power Europe Mark II based mainly on the second of the two elements of the 
original Duchêne definition. 
 
What matters is the output, that is the promotion of human rights and 
other democratic principles in the world. Non-military means must be favoured 
in so far as the use of force often creates more problems than it solves. But one 
should not totally exclude it as there are cases where force is necessary. This is 
an interpretation very close to Maull’s argument that Germany remains still a 
civilian power despite its participation in NATO-led military actions. 
 
                                                                 
55 Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power Europe’, 15-16. 
56 International Herald Tribune, 23-24 September 2000.  
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This approach also raises a wider issue: can there really be a civilian 
power Europe without military means? Or, all you get then is just a civilian 
entity or presence, without any substantial impact on international affairs? In 
short, civilian power does not equate pacifism. Such a view considers military 
means to be on the one end of a long spectrum, with trade and use of economic 
sanctions on the other. This continuum also implies that sanctions should not 
only be  seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the 
extreme case of using force. This sounds very much like Bull’s argument on the 
limitations of the civilian power Europe concept back in the 1980s, but from a 
completely different perspective: instead of ignoring the concept, it builds on it, 
by stressing the link between military muscle and the export of democratic 
principles. A simple example might help us understand what I actually mean: to 
have an armed police force does not mean they have to use guns all the time, but 
the possibility of using them is always there. The same applies to unarmed 
police forces which always have a special unit provided with weapons. In other 
words, the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the 
possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of an international actor. 
Equally important is the fact that by not having a military option the range of 
possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible. Thus, the USA’s foreign 
policy has been as important in the past in areas of direct involvement as it has 
been in areas of non-involvement
57. But by having both military and non-
military options, the Americans enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre when 
dealing with international issues. 
 
Of course, this should not be seen a ‘call to arms’. Not all problems can 
be resolved by force. There is however a clear distinction to be made between 
short-term solutions and long terms ones. Sometimes, a rapid military action 
might prevent a worse l ong-term problem. I am perfectly aware that one cannot 
prove that what did not take place might have worked, but for instance if the 
wars in the Balkans had been stopped by military force in 1991 perhaps the ten 
years of utter destruction would not have taken place. A similar argument would 
apply in my view to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. 
 
To use the NATO Secretary General (Lord Roberston) words, ‘ Sans 
capacités militaires, l’Europe serait un tigre de papier’
58. Again, the Balkans 
come to mind, and whether it is Bosnia or in Kosovo, there is little doubt that the 
Europeans did not have any real impact on events on the grounds, contrary to 
the USA (once it was decided in Washington that something had to be done). It 
is interesting to note that a military presence on the ground as was the case with 
West European national forces under the UN in Bosnia is not a guarantee of 
success. It occasionally allows for some influence but no real power. Of course, 
                                                                 
57 Gnesotto, La puissance et l’Europe, 37. 
58 Le Monde interview, 4 November 1999.  
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deploying troops without prior political agreement on what to do is not a good 
policy either. This is what seemed to be the case in Bosnia
59. 
 
Furthermore, this continuum can be clearly seen in the introduction of 
civilian forms of action in the non-military field: police action and the like. In its 
July 2000 programme, the French Presidency declared that one of its main 
objectives would be as follows: 
 
‘Strengthening the reaction capability and the synergy of non-military crisis 
management instruments is an aspect of the European Union approach to which the 
French Presidency will also devote considerable attention, since the Union's strength is 
vested in its capacity to make rational use of the full range of crisis management 
instruments at its disposal. The creation of the Committee for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis  Management, decided on by the Council on 22 May 2000, should be 
particularly relevant for continuing the work already begun and making further 
progress in this area on the basis of the concrete objectives identified at Santa Maria 
da Feira, particularly as regards police capabilities’
60.  
 
Of course, there is no evidence that such a programme, however desirable, will 
materialise without any problems. During 2000 the saga between Bernard 
Kouchner and Jean-Pierre Chevenement, respectively in charge of Kosovo and 
the then Interior Minister of France, over the need for more police officers in the 
NATO-controlled entity showed the discrepancy between rhetoric and reality. 
Chevenement argued that there was a need for more police officers in the French 
inner-cities and therefore it was not possible for France to send more policemen 
to Yugoslavia. 
 
In the post-Cold War world, there might be less use for military force but 
this does not mean it is absolutely useless. What has probably changed in a 
dramatic fashion is t he obsolescence of major war. But that does not mean, 
unfortunately, the end of violence
61. There is a difference between 'total war' and 
intra-state conflict or 'limited war' (be it ethnic cleansing by machete à -la-
Rwanda or by bullets-in-the-head or systematic rape à-la-Bosnia). After the end 
of the nuclear stalemate between the USA and the USSR in 1989-91, the 
prospect of a holocaust caused by a massive nuclear exchange has receded. 
Moreover, it is not completely clear if major war is totally off the international 
agenda or if it is just a lull. Thus, proliferation in nuclear technologies (India-
Pakistan summer 1999) and in ballistic delivery systems (the so-called rogue 
states) has led to a revival of a ballistic-missile defence system (which has 
always e xisted since the creation of nuclear weapons but has been limited by 
                                                                 
59 Gnesotto, La puissance et l’Europe, 33. 
60 http://www.presidence-europe.fr/pfue/static/acces5.htm. 
61 see Gray, C., ‘Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS’,  Review of 
International Studies, 25, special issue (1999): 161-182.  
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international treaty; latest effort before the current one was the famous Star 
Wars or SDI of Ronald Reagan). In short, military force continues to matter. 
   
Conclusions: What Next for the Concept of a Civilian Power? 
 
The main suggestion of this paper is that we need to move from the concept of a 
civilian power 'by default' to that of a civilian power 'by design' (or by 
conviction). That is to say to move away from a 'naked king' civilian power (no 
military capacity) which really amounted to a civilian presence in the 
international system. If ends, and not only means, are needed to be a civilian 
power, it would confirm that US foreign policy is not always one of a civilian 
type (characteristic number two) as the USA have supported dictatorships 
throughout the world in recent years, only disguising a non-democratic policy as 
a fight against communism. Forgetting thus that democracies must respect 
democratic principles if they are to remain such. The discrepancy between the 
rhetoric and the reality of EU policy is similar: even without the defence 
dimension right now, there is a plethora of examples where the EU has refused 
to act to try and reverse a non-democratic regime or the military occupation of 
another country
62. In brief, it the EU’s reality matched its rhetoric it would be 
acting like a civilian power even without military means. But that does not 
imply that the EU does not need those military means from time to time. 
Experience has shown the limits of EU action when military means were needed 
but not available. The best examples come mainly, but not exclusively, the 
Balkans over the last ten years or so. 
 
The key conclusion is that, rather than seeing the militarising of the EU as 
the  end of the concept of a civilian power, such a development makes the 
concept even more useful. But it also means that the EU will have to be very 
careful about how it will use its developing military capacity. 
 
                                                                 
62 for Cyprus, see Stavridis, S., ‘Double Standards, Ethics and Democratic Principles in 
Foreign Policy: The European Union and the Cyprus Problem’,  Mediterranean Politics, 4, 
no.1 (1999): 95-112.  
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In short, it is hoped that this paper has reversed the trend towards the 
announcement of the premature death of a concept by showing that concepts 
have various dimensions and that only half of the initial definition was used in 
the past two to three decades. The emphasis on non-military means was perhaps 
useful during the nuclear stalemate and the predominance of the bipolar world. 
But this is no longer the case and it is hoped that a more ethical international 
system will allow for more civilian power with regards to the promotion of 
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